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Abstract— In the hope of stimulating discussion, we
present a heuristic decision tree that designers can use to
judge the likely suitability of a P2P architecture for their ap-
plications. It is based on the characteristics of a wide range
of P2P systems from the literature, both proposed and de-
ployed.
1. INTRODUCTION
Academic research in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems has
concentrated largely on algorithms to improve the effi-
ciency [27], scalability [19], robustness [9], and secu-
rity [29] of query routing in P2P systems, services such as
indexing and search [17], and dissemination [14] for ap-
plications running on top of these systems, or even all of
the above [15]. While these improvements may be essen-
tial to enhancing the performance of some P2P applica-
tions, there has been little focus on what makes an applica-
tion “P2P-worthy,” or on which other, previously ignored
applications may benefit from a P2P solution. What ques-
tions should an application designer ask to judge whether
a P2P solution is appropriate for his particular problem?
In this position paper, we hope to stimulate the discus-
sion by distilling the experience of a broad range of pro-
posed and deployed P2P systems into a methodology for
judging how suitable a P2P architecture might be for a
particular problem. In Section 2, we identify some salient
characteristic axes in typical distributed problems. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe a spectrum of specific problems for
which P2P solutions have been proposed. In Section 4, we
propose an arrangement of problem characteristics into a
heuristic decision tree. We walk through the tree explain-
ing its choices and why we believe certain paths may lead
to successful P2P solutions to important problems, while
other paths may encounter difficulties.
2. CHARACTERISTIC PROBLEM AXES
In this section, we describe the characteristics of dis-
tributed problems we believe are important in assessing
their P2P-worthiness. As seems to be the consensus in
the research community [23], we identify as peer-to-peer
those environments that satisfy the following three crite-
ria:
• Self-organizing: Nodes organize themselves into a
network through a process in which they discover
other peers.
• Symmetric communication: Peers are considered
equals; they both request and offer services, rather
than being confined to either client or server roles.
• Decentralized: There is neither a global directory nor
a central controller dictating behavior to individual
nodes. Instead, peers rely on communication with
each other for discovery of other peers, resources
and services, and determine their course of action au-
tonomously.
Our axes are the problem’s budget, the relevance of re-
sources to individual peers, the rate of system change, the
level of mutual trust, and the criticality of the resources
handled. In more detail:
Budget: If the budget for a solution is ample, a de-
signer is unlikely to consider worthwhile the inefficien-
cies, latencies and testing problems of a P2P solution. If
the budget is limited, a key motivator in the choice of P2P
architectures is the lowest possible cost of entry for indi-
vidual peers, despite increased total system cost. Assem-
bling a system from local, often surplus, components can
be justified as a small part of many budgets and may be
the only feasible approach.
Resource relevance to participants: Relevance is the
probability that a peer is interested in data from other
peers. If it is high, P2P cooperation evolves naturally. If
it is low, artificial or extrinsic incentives may be needed.
Trust: Mutual distrust between peers may be essential
to the problem or of little concern. However, the cost of
mutual distrust in P2P systems is high and needs to be
justified by specific problem requirements.
Rate of system change: The participants, resources
and parameters of the system may be stable or rapidly
changing. Rapid change in P2P systems can make it
difficult to provide consistency guarantees and defenses
against flooding and other attacks.
2Criticality: If the problem being solved is critical to the
users, they may demand centralized control irrespective of
technical criteria. Even if P2P is not ruled out, the need
for expensive security or massive over-provisioning may
make it uneconomic.
We have excluded other characteristics which, while
important, did not affect the decision tree as far as we have
elaborated it. Among these are whether the resources are
public or private, whether the resources are naturally dis-
tributed, whether the time horizon of the application is
long or short, and whether participants are homogeneous
or heterogeneous.
3. CANDIDATE PROBLEMS
Our candidate problems for a P2P architecture come
from routing, backup, monitoring, data sharing, data dis-
semination, and auditing.
3.1 Routing Problems
All distributed systems need a routing layer to get mes-
sages to their intended recipients. Routing takes on P2P
characteristics when the scale is large enough (e.g., the
Internet) or when centralization is ruled out (e.g., wireless
ad hoc networks).
3.1.1 Internet Routing: Internet routers must commu-
nicate to cope with dynamically changing network topol-
ogy to determine how to route outbound packets to their
destination. They are arranged into “autonomous sys-
tems” which “peer” with each other across organizational
boundaries, frequently between competitors.
Routing protocols have historically assumed that eco-
nomic incentives and legal contracts are sufficient to dis-
courage misbehavior. At the application layer (e.g., Re-
silient Overlay Networks (RON) [1]) or at the network
layer (e.g., BGP [18]), routers trust information from
known peers. They cooperate because the information be-
ing exchanged is of interest to all peers and important to
their function. This cooperation tends to fail if error, mis-
behavior or usage patterns cause the data to change too
fast. To scale to the size of the Internet, BGP tries to limit
the rate of change by aggregating routes instead of having
ISPs propagate internal routing updates. Aggregation re-
duces the ability to detect path outages quickly [16]. RON
instead gives up scaling to large numbers of nodes in favor
of more fine-grained route information exchanges.
3.1.2 Ad hoc Routing in Disaster Recovery: The ad
hoc routing problem is to use transient resources, such as
the wireless communication devices of a disaster recov-
ery crew, to deploy temporary network infrastructure for a
specific purpose. Because each individual node’s wireless
range does not reach all other nodes, peers in the network
forward packets on behalf of each other. The costly alter-
native is to provide more permanent infrastructure for all
possible eventualities in all possible locations. The net-
work is of relevance and critical to all participants, and
pre-configured security can give a high level of mutual
trust. Once established, the participants (humans in the
crew) typically change and move slowly, and do not ex-
change huge volumes of data.
3.1.3 Metropolitan-area Cell Phone Forwarding: Ad
hoc routing has also been proposed in less critical set-
tings, such as that of public, ad hoc cellular telephony in
dense metropolitan areas. The motivation is to reduce the
costs of deploying enough base stations and to avoid pay-
ment for air time where traffic does not pass through base
stations. Unlike the disaster recovery problem, the par-
ticipants do not trust each other, they change and move
rapidly, and their local resources such as battery power
are limited. In its current state, this problem suffers from
the “Tragedy of the Commons” [11]. We doubt that a
practical P2P solution to this problem exists, unless ei-
ther on-going research [2], [3] devises strong, “strategy-
proof” mechanisms to combat selfishness, or the scope
of the problem is limited to close-knit communities with
“built-in” incentives for participation.
3.2 Backup
Backup, the process in which a user replicates his files
in different media at different locations to increase data
survivability, can benefit greatly from the pooling of oth-
erwise underutilized resources. Unfortunately, the fact
that each peer is interested only in its own data opens the
way to selfish peer behavior.
3.2.1 Internet Backup: The cost of backup could be
reduced if Internet-wide cooperation [6], [7] could be in-
centivized and enforced. For example in Samsara [6]
peers must hold real or simulated data equivalent to the
space other peers hold for them. But there is no guar-
antee an untrusted node will provide backup data when
requested, even if it has passed periodic checks to ensure
it still has those data. Such a misbehaving or faulty node
may in turn have its backup data elsewhere dropped in re-
taliation. If misbehaving, it may already have anticipated
this reaction and, if faulty, it is exactly why it would par-
ticipate in a backup scheme in the first place. We believe
that data backup is poorly suited for a P2P environment
running across trust boundaries.
3.2.2 Corporate Backup: In contrast, when partici-
pants enjoy high mutual trust, e.g., within the confines
of an enterprise intranet, P2P backup makes sense (Hive-
Cache [12] is one such commercial offering). This is be-
3cause selfish behavior is unlikely when a sense of trusting
community or a top-down corporate mandate impose par-
ticipation, obviating the need for enforceable compliance
incentives.
3.3 Distributed Monitoring
Monitoring is an important task in any large distributed
system. It may have simple needs such as “subscribing”
to first-order events and expecting notification when those
events are “published” (e.g., Scribe [24]); it may involve
more complicated, on-line manipulation, for instance via
SQL queries, of complex distributed data streams such
as network packet traces, CPU loads, virus signatures
(as in the on-line network monitoring problem motivat-
ing PIER [13]); it may be the basis for an off-line, post
mortem longitudinal study of many, high-volume data
streams, such as the longitudinal network studies per-
formed by Fomenkov et al. [8].
Although the abstract monitoring problem is character-
ized by natural distribution of the data sources monitored,
specific instances of the problem vary vastly. A longi-
tudinal off-line network study, though important, is not
necessarily critical to its recipients, and has low timeli-
ness and rate-of-change constraints. In contrast, an ISP
may consider the on-line, on-time monitoring of its re-
sources and those of its neighbors’ extremely critical for
its survival. Similarly, the mechanisms for complex net-
work monitoring described by Huebsch et al. [13] may
be appropriate for administratively closed, high-trust en-
vironments such as PlanetLab, and they may be quite in-
appropriate in environments lacking mutual trust and rife
with fraud or subversion; whereas an off-line long-term
network study affords its investigators more time for data
validation against tampering.
3.4 Data Sharing
3.4.1 File sharing: In file sharing systems, partici-
pants offer their local files to other peers and search col-
lections to find interesting files. The cost of deployment
is very low since most peers store only items that they are
interested in anyway. Resource relevance is high; a great
deal of content appeals to a large population of peers. In
typical file sharing networks, peer turnover and file addi-
tion is high, leading to a high rate of change of the system.
Peers trust each other to deliver the advertised content and
most popular file sharing networks do not have the capac-
ity to resist malicious peers. File sharing is mainly used
to trade media content, which is not a critical application.
3.4.2 Censorship Resistance: The goal of the FreeNet
project [4] is to create an anonymous, censorship-resistant
data store. Both publishing and document requests are
routed through a mix-net and all content is encrypted by
the content’s creator. These steps are necessary because
peers are mutually suspicious and some peers may be ma-
licious. Peers share their bandwidth as well as disk space,
which puts FreeNet on the low end of the budget axis.
FreeNet is intended to provide a medium for material that
some group wishes to suppress, thus data are relevant to
many consumers as well as attackers. It is critical that the
content in the system be protected from censorship. Pub-
lished material does not need to be available immediately,
so FreeNet can work with a low rate of change.
Tangler [28] has similar goals. A peer stores his docu-
ment by encoding the document using erasure codes and
distributing the resulting fragments throughout the com-
munity. To prevent an adversary from biasing where those
fragments are distributed, a peer must combine his doc-
ument with pseudo-randomness before erasure coding;
he uses other peers’ documents as a source of pseudo-
randomness. To retrieve his own document, a peer must
store locally the randomness used at storage time, i.e.,
other peers’ documents. Although the problem lacks
inherent incentives for participation, this solution inge-
niously supplies them.
3.5 Data Dissemination
Data dissemination is akin to data sharing, with the
distinction that the problem is not to store data indefi-
nitely but, instead, to spread the data for a relatively short
amount of time. Often storing is combined with spread-
ing.
3.5.1 Usenet: Usenet, perhaps the oldest and most
successful P2P application, is a massively distributed dis-
cussion system in which users post messages to “news-
groups.” These articles are then disseminated to other
hosts subscribing to the particular newsgroup, and made
available to local users. Usenet has been a staple of the
Internet for decades, arguably because of the low cost bar-
rier to peer entry and the high relevance of the content to
participating peers. Unfortunately, although the system
flourished at a time when mutual trust was assumed, it re-
mains vulnerable to many forms of attack, perhaps jeop-
ardizing its future in less innocent times.
3.5.2 Non-critical Content Distribution: Dissemina-
tion of programs, program updates, streaming media [5],
[14], and even cooperative web caching [30] are all non-
critical applications of content distribution. The problem
involves content with generally low rates of change, al-
though the participants may change wildly.
4One successful application is BitTorrent [5], which mit-
igates the congestion at the download server when a pop-
ular new program or update is posted. Its tit-for-tat policy
is effective despite low peer trust, and the option of post-
poning download until later reduces its criticality.
Collaborative web caching, although superficially at-
tractive, has not succeeded. As the system scales up,
relevance of the content decreases, making it less useful.
When the scale is small enough to make the content rele-
vant, the system’s complexity is unjustified [30].
3.5.3 Critical Flash Crowds: Other specific instances
of dissemination have been proposed to address flash
crowds [25], [26] which could be used to distribute critical
data, such as news updates during a major disaster.
3.6 Auditing
3.6.1 Digital Preservation: The LOCKSS system pre-
serves academic e-journals in a network of autonomous
web caches. Peers each obtain their own complete repli-
cas of the content by crawling the publisher’s web site. If
the content becomes unavailable from the publisher, the
local copy is supplied to local readers. The replicas are
preserved using a P2P protocol [21] that provides mutual
audit and repair, but this is not time critical; thus the rate
of change is low. The content being preserved is highly
relevant to many peers. The audit process uses “opin-
ion polls” so that peers trust the consensus of other peers
but not any individual peer. Mutual distrust is essential to
prevent cascade failures which could destroy every copy
of the preserved content. The automatic audit and repair
process allows peers to be built from cheap, unreliable
hardware with very little need for administration, which
is important in the budget-constrained world of libraries.
3.6.2 Distributed Time Stamping: A secure time
stamping service [10] acts as the digital equivalent of a
notary public: it maintains a history of the creation and
contents of digital documents, allowing clients who trust
the service to determine which document was “notarized”
first. Correlating the histories of multiple, mutually dis-
trustful secure time stamping services [20] is important,
because not everyone doing business in the world can be
convinced to trust the same centralized service; being able
to map time stamps issued elsewhere to a local trust do-
main is essential for critical documents (such as contracts)
from disparate jurisdictions. Luckily, sensitive documents
such as contracts change little or not at all at very low
rates, and high latencies for obtaining or verifying secure
time stamps are acceptable, facilitating the development
of an efficient-enough P2P solution to the problem.
4. 2 P2P OR NOT 2 P2P?
Figure 1 is a decision tree organizing our characteris-
tics to determine whether a particular application is P2P-
worthy. We examine our example applications traversing
this tree in a breadth-first manner.
At the top of the tree we have the “budget” axis. We
believe that limited budget is the most important motivator
for a P2P solution. With limited budget, the low cost for a
peer to join a P2P solution is very appealing. Otherwise,
a centralized or centrally controlled distributed solution
will provide lower complexity and higher performance for
the extra money. Our tree thus continues only along the
“limited” budget end of the axis.
Our next most important characteristic is the “rele-
vance” of the resource in question. The more relevant
(important to others) the resource, the more motivated
peers in a P2P architecture are to participate. Applica-
tions of low relevance with good P2P solutions exist, but
only where other inherent reasons for a P2P solution are
strong, as we explain below.
The next axis in the tree is “mutual trust.” Successful
P2P solutions with trusting peers exist, as do those whose
other characteristics justify the performance and complex-
ity cost of measures to cope with mutual distrust. Those
applications with low relevance and low trust have the
burden of incentivizing cooperation. While Tangler is a
good example of this, we believe that metropolitan ad hoc
wireless networks and Internet backup have not yet suc-
ceeded. The motivations for these applications seem in-
adequate to overcome the low relevance of the resources
and the overheads of protecting against uncooperative or
malicious peers. Where peers are assumed to cooperate,
applications such as corporate backup may succeed, since
corporate mandate compensates for low relevance. Un-
fortunately, no such external compensation appears to ex-
ist for cooperative web caching; its marginal performance
benefits due to low relevance at large scales renders it un-
necessary [30].
Where relevance is high, the level of trust between
nodes still has an impact on the suitability of a P2P so-
lution for the application. Creating artificial economies
or “trading” schemes to provide extrinsic incentives for
cooperation (as in MojoNation) is generally unsuccess-
ful [22]. The overhead in terms of complexity and perfor-
mance for managing mutually distrustful nodes suggests
that applications will be difficult to implement success-
fully in a P2P system, unless other characteristics inter-
cede to simplify the problem.
Such a characteristic is the rate of change in the system.
Applications with a low rate of change, such as LOCKSS,
FreeNet, and distributed time stamping, may succeed de-
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A DECISION TREE FOR ANALYZING THE SUITABILITY OF A P2P SOLUTION.
spite mutually distrusting peers. For these applications,
mutual distrust between peers is an inherent part of the
problem, and thus its cost must be born by any proposed
solutions. The cost, however, is reduced by the low rate
of change, which makes it possible to detect problems in
the system in time to address them, and reduces the per-
formance impact of the measures to protect against mali-
cious peers. P2P applications with a high rate of change
in untrustworthy environments are unlikely to succeed.
The rate of change in the system remains important
even for applications in which peers may trust each other
to cooperate. If the rate of change is low, then both
non-critical applications (such as off-line network stud-
ies, Usenet, and content distribution) and critical appli-
cations (such as ad hoc wireless network deployment for
disaster recovery and flash crowd mitigation) may suc-
ceed. If the system moves quickly, we believe that it is
easier to deploy non-critical applications such as song file
sharing. When the problem involves critical information
that also changes quickly (as in the case of Internet rout-
ing and on-line network monitoring), the designer should
consider whether the application benefits sufficiently from
other features. To the degree that Internet routing is suc-
cessful, it is because it is amenable to trading accuracy
for scalability through techniques such as aggregation of
data. If network monitoring succeeds, it will be because
the natural distribution and high volume of the data allow
few other appropriate solution architectures beyond P2P.
5. CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, the characteristics that motivate a P2P
solution are limited budget, high relevance of the resource,
high trust between nodes, a low rate of change in the sys-
tem, and a low criticality of the solution. We believe
that the limited budget requirement is the most impor-
tant motivator. Relevance is also very important but can
be compensated for by “saving graces” such as assumed
trust between nodes or strong imposed incentives. Lack-
ing these, we believe that applications of low relevance are
not appropriate for P2P solutions. Trust between nodes
greatly eases P2P deployment, however there are some
applications, such as LOCKSS, FreeNet and distributed
time stamping, where deployment across trust domains
is an inherent requirement. These applications must pay
the overhead of distrust between nodes, but are feasible in
a P2P context because a low rate of change makes these
costs manageable.
While P2P solutions offer many advantages, they are
inherently complex to get right and should not be ap-
plied blindly to all problems. In providing a framework
in which to analyze the characteristics of a problem, we
hope to offer designers with some guidance as to whether
their problem warrants a P2P solution.
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